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NOTES
CONTRACT LAW-FIXED PRICE OPTION VS. RIGHT OF
FIRST REFUSAL: CONSTRUCTION OF A DUAL OPTION
LEASE-Texaco, Inc. v. Creel.
INTRODUCTION
This note focuses on the proper interpretation of what has
been referred to as a dual option lease; that is, a lease containing
both an option to purchase at a fixed price and a right of first re-
fusal. The issue is the relationship between the fixed price option
and the right of first refusal. Does the lessee's failure to exercise
the right of first refusal extinguish his rights under the fixed price
option, effectively forcing him to meet any bona fide third party
offer or risk the loss of his investment? Or, are the two provisions
independent of each other; the exercise, or non-exercise, of one
having no effect upon the other?
This issue has prompted a sizeable amount of litigation with
two interpretations emerging as predominate. One line of cases
holds that the fixed price option and the right of first refusal are
completely independent of each other and the exercise of one has
no effect on the other.' Another line of cases holds that the options
are dependent on each other; the exercise of one, or the failure to
exercise one, extinguishes the lessee's rights under the other.2
The North Carolina Supreme Court was faced with a dual op-
tion lease in Texaco, Inc. v. Creel.3 The court held that the lessee's
failure to meet a bona fide third party offer under the first refusal
option did not extinguish the lessee's right to exercise the fixed
price option at any time during the lease period.4 In doing so, the
court followed Butler v. Richardson5 and the line of cases holding
that the dual options are separate and operate independently of
1. Butler v. Richardson, 74 R.I. 344, 60 A.2d 718 (1948).
2. Shell Oil Co. v. Blumberg, 154 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1946).
3. 310 N.C. 695, 314 S.E.2d 506 (1984).
4. Id. at 704, 314 S.E.2d at 511.
5. 74 R.I. 344, 60 A.2d 718.
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each other. The case is one of first impression in North Carolina. It
sets the standard for interpreting an ambiguous dual option lease
in which the relationship between the fixed price option and right
of first refusal is not clearly spelled out. From a national perspec-
tive, the case adds to the body of case law stressing adherence to
established rules of contract construction and interpretation.
This note will suggest that the court's decision comports with
sound principles of contract and property law and the probable in-
tention of the parties to the agreement.
THE CASE
In 1949, Texaco, Inc., the plaintiff's predecessor in interest,
leased a lot on Franklin Street in Chapel Hill, North Carolina from
the defendants' predecessors in interest. The lease was to run for
ten years and the lessee was given the option to extend the term
for four additional five-year terms. Texaco elected to extend the
lease for all four extensions so the lease was due to expire on Janu-
ary 31, 1980. The rent for the duration of the lease, including any
extensions, was set at $100 per month.' The lease contained both a
fixed price option for $50,000 which could be exercised at any time
during the term of the lease or any extension or renewal thereof,
and a clause granting an option to exercise first refusal rights.7 Fol-
lowing these two clauses was a paragraph stating:
6. 310 N.C. at 696, 314 S.E.2d at 507.
7. Id. at 697, 314 S.E.2d at 507. (11) - Option to Purchase. Lessor hereby
grants to lessee the exclusive right, at lessee's option, to purchase the
demised premises, free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, including
leases, (which were not on the premises at the date of this lease) at any
time during the term of this lease or any extension or renewal thereof,
(a) for the sum of Fifty Thousand dollars; it being understood that
if any part of said premises be condemned, the amount of damages
awarded to or accepted by lessor as a result thereof shall be de-
ducted from such price,
(b) On the same terms and at the same price as any bona fide offer
for said premises received by lessor and which offer lessor desires
to accept. Upon receipt of a bona fide offer, and each time any such
offer is received, lessor (or his assigns) shall immediately notify
lessee, in writing, of the full details of such offer, including the
name and address of any offeror, whereupon lessee shall have
thirty (30) days after receipt of such notice in which to elect to
exercise lessee's prior right to purchase. No sale of or transfer of
title to said premises shall be binding on lessee unless and until
these requirements are fully complied with.
[Vol. 7:349
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Any option herein granted shall be continuing and preemptive,
binding on the lessor's heirs, devisees, administrators, executors,
or assigns, and the failure of lessee to exercise same in any one
case shall not affect lessee's right to exercise such option in other
cases thereafter arising during the term of this lease or any exten-
sion or renewal thereof.8
In January 1980, the defendants received several bona fide of-
fers from third parties for more than $50,000, the highest offer be-
ing $217,000. On January 17, Texaco gave written notice of its in-
tention to exercise the fixed price option for $50,000, and even
attempted to tender the purchase price by check on February 1.
The defendant lessors, believing the contract required Texaco to
meet the highest offer, refused to convey title to the property. Tex-
aco filed suit on February 4, 1980, for specific performance of the
contract. Defendants counterclaimed, asserting it had been dam-
aged in the amount of $217,000 when the would-be purchaser with-
drew his offer because of his reluctance to "buy a lawsuit."9
At trial, both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial
court denied plaintiff Texaco's motion concluding that Texaco was
not entitled to specific performance. A jury trial was held on the
defendants' counterclaims, and the trial court directed a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff on its motion at the close of the defendants'
evidence. Both sides appealed. The court of appeals reversed the
trial court and entered summary judgment for Texaco and ordered
specific performance of the fixed option agreement. 10
The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that
the properly exercised fixed price option continued to bind the de-
fendant lessors or their successors in interest even though Texaco,
the lessee, failed to meet the bona fide third-party offer. 1
8. Id. at 697, 314 S.E.2d at 507. -
9. Id. at 698, 314 S.E.2d at 508. Plaintiff filed a notice of lis pendens on the
property in addition to filing suit for specific performance. Defendants asserted in
their counterclaim that they were entitled to treble damages because the filing of
lis pendens was an unfair and deceptive trade practice. Id.
10. Texaco, Inc. v. Creel, 57 N.C. App. 611, 292 S.E.2d 130 (1982). The North
Carolina Court of Appeals held that it was bound by the general rule that a con-
tract must be read as a whole. Individual clauses and particular words in an
agreement must be considered in connection with the rest of the agreement. The
court summarized the split of authority in other jurisdictions involving leases sub-
stantially similar to the one under consideration, and adopted the view that it
thought was most faithful to the language of the lease, i.e., that the fixed price
option and the right of first refusal operated independently of each other. Id.
11. 310 N.C. at 704, 314 S.E.2d at 511.
19851
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BACKGROUND
The first significant case construing dual options as separate
and independent is Butler v. Richardson,2 a 1948 case decided by
the Rhode Island Supreme Court. In that case, the lessees entered
into a one year lease of real estate with the lessors, owners of the
real estate. The lease contained both a fixed price option for
$15,000 exercisable at any time during the lease period, any exten-
sion or renewal, and a right of first refusal. 3 The lessors received
an offer from a third party, notified the lessees and requested that
the lessees exercise their right to purchase per the terms of the
lease. The lessees immediately notified the lessors of their intent to
exercise the fixed price option for $15,000, and at the lessors' re-
quest, sent $500 to bind the deal. The lessors refused to convey the
property for $15,000, and the lessees sued for specific performance
of the lease. In resolving the controversy, the court was faced with
the question of what effect the provision for a right of first refusal
has upon the provision for a fixed price option. The court held that
it had no effect whatsoever. The fixed price option remained
unimpaired. The court said that the provision for a right of first
refusal should be construed not so much as an alternative to the
provision for an option but rather as a supplement to
it-supplemental in the sense that through the right of first re-
fusal, the lessors could induce the lessees to purchase by giving
them an opportunity to purchase at a price more advantageous to
the lessees than the price fixed in the option. 4
In Sinclair Refining Co. v. Clay,15 a 1951 Ohio decision, dual
option provisions were included in a lease of realty for the opera-
tion of a neighborhood filling station. The lease, prepared by Sin-
12. 74 R.I. 344, 60 A.2d 718.
13. It is mutually agreed that, at any time while the Lessees are the oc-
cupants of the premises herein leased, as Lessees under this lease or any
extension thereof or renewal thereof, or as tenants from month to month
or otherwise, the Lessors will give them an option to buy at a price of
$15,000. Or if the Lessors shall have any offer for the purchase of said
premises, which the Lessors are willing to accept, the Lessors prior to
accepting same, give the Lessees an opportunity to purchase the said
premises on the same terms, by notifying the Lessees in writing of such
offer and giving the Lessees 10 days thereafter in which the Lessees shall
decide if they will purchase said premises on the same terms.
74 R.I. at 348, 60 A.2d at 720.
14. Id. at 350, 60 A.2d at 722.
15. 102 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Ohio 1951), aff'd, 194 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1952).
[Vol. 7:349
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clair, the lessee, was for a period of ten years and included a provi-
sion for a five year extension. In the lease, Sinclair was given a
fixed price option for $8500, which could be exercised at any time
during the last five years of the lease term or any extension. The
lessee was also given a right of first refusal. The lessor sold the
premises to a third party after Sinclair had declined to exercise its
right of first refusal. Five years after the sale, Sinclair attempted to
exercise the fixed price option. The lessor refused to convey, and
Sinclair sued for specific performance. At trial, the lessor argued
that the fixed price option was extinguished after Sinclair declined
to exercise its right of first refusal.16 The court disagreed. It held
that the two provisions were separate and distinct. The failure to
exercise a right of first refusal after proper notice may well extin-
guish the first refusal right, but the loss of that right still leaves
the fixed price option operational. 7 The court further held that
the fixed price option is a covenant which runs with the land and a
grantee of the lessor is bound by the terms of the covenant. 18
Paralleling Texaco v. Creel, even though Sinclair, the lessee,
drafted the arguably ambiguous lease (as did Texaco in Creel), the
court refused to construe it strictly against Sinclair.
Adams v. Willis,19 a 1953 South Carolina case, dealt with a
dual option lease similar to the one in Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Clay. The lease contained a fixed price option and a right of first
refusal. The right of first refusal clause contained language to the
effect that if the lessee did not elect to exercise the right of first
refusal, the lessor could go ahead and sell the property subject to
the lease "and to the extension and/or additional purchase options,
if any, herein granted to the lessee."'20 The lessor received a bona
fide offer from a third party. The lessee chose not to exercise the
first refusal rights, and the lessor sold the property to the third
party. Subsequently, still during the lease period, the lessee's as-
signee attempted to exercise the fixed price option. The lessor's
assignee refused, arguing that the refusal of the lessee to purchase
the property under the right of first refusal terminated the lessee's
right thereafter to exercise its purchase option.2'
The South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed, holding that
16. 102 F. Supp. at 733.
17. Id. at 734.
18. Id. at 734 (citing 3A THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY §§ 1325-30 (1959)).
19. 225 S.C. 518, 83 S.E.2d 171 (1954).
20. Id. at 525, 83 S.E.2d at 174.
21. Id.
1985]
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the lessee had the right to buy the property at any time during the
term of the lease, at the price set in the fixed price option.22 In
making its decision, the court stressed the language in the lease
providing that any sale to a third party would be subject to the
fixed price option. This language is comparable to the clause in the
Creel lease which provided that "[a]ny option herein granted shall
be continuing and preemptive . ",23 The argument that the Wil-
lis language is more clearly stated than the Creel language and
thus the two cases are distinguishable is not persuasive. The lan-
guage in Creel was construed not by laymen, but by a court profi-
cient in discerning the meaning of less-than-clear language in a le-
gal document.
Green v. Sprague Ranches24 involved an unusual situation in
which the lease was modified twice-first to include a right of first
refusal and then later to include a fixed price option. The lessor
received a bona fide offer from a third party and notified the lessee
under the terms of the right of first refusal. The lessee declined to
exercise its right of first refusal. Instead, the lessee notified the les-
sor of its intent to exercise the fixed price option. The lessor
sought declaratory relief and reformation of the lease.25
The trial court held for the lessor, finding that the fixed price
option was extinguished by the lessee's failure to meet the terms of
the third party offer. The district court of appeal reversed the trial
court and ordered a new trial. Commenting that previous cases
were split on what to do with these clauses, the court said each
decision turns on its particular facts and contract language. The
court found the intention of the parties was more reasonably inter-
preted as the desire to create an independent and separate right
not extinguishable by the lessee's failure to exercise the right of
first refusal.26
The holding probably has limited utility due to the fact that
the court was interpreting a lease to which a right of first refusal
and a fixed price option had been added at separate times. The
court did not comment on how important this fact was to their
decision.
Finally, Crowley v. Texaco, Inc.,2 7 a case the North Carolina
22. Id. at 526, 83 S.E.2d at 175.
23. 310 N.C. at 697, 314 S.E.2d at 507.
24. 170 Cal. App. 2d 687, 339 P.2d 607 (1959).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 691, 339 P.2d at 610.
27. 306 N.W.2d 871 (S.D. 1981).
[Vol. 7:349
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Supreme Court relied on to decide Texaco, Inc. v. Creel, concerned
a lease agreement with purchase options similar to those found in
Creel. The lease in Crowley contained a fixed price option coupled
with a right of first refusal. As was the case in Creel, the lease
further specified:
Any option herein granted shall be continuing and preemp-
tive binding on the lessor's heirs, devisees, administrators, execu-
tors, or assigns, and the failure of lessee to exercise same in any
one case shall not affect lessee's right to exercise such option in
other cases thereafter arising during the term of this lease or any
extension or renewal thereof.2
During the lease term, the lessors received an offer from a
third party which they desired to accept. They communicated the
offer to the lessee pursuant to the right of first refusal. Through
inaction, the lessee failed to exercise its right to purchase; however,
several months later, the lessee notified the lessors of its intent to
exercise its fixed price option. The court held that the fixed price
option remained unimpaired by the lessee's failure to exercise the
right of first refusal.2 9 Using several rules of construction,"0 the
court held that the "continuing and preemptive" language could
not be given full effect if the lessee's failure to exercise the right of
first refusal was held to terminate the fixed price option.31
The line of cases in support of the interpretation that failure
to exercise the right of first refusal extinguishes the fixed price op-
tion begins with Harding v. Gibbs.2 In Harding, the parties signed
a five year lease of real property. The lease contained a fixed price
option which could be exercised by' the lessee any time during the
first year of the lease. It also gave the lessee a right of first refusal
stipulating that if the lessor received an offer for the property, the
lessee would be given ten days notice and the privilege of buying at
such offer. If the lessee decided not to purchase, the lessor would
have the privilege of selling. Within the first year of the lease, the
lessor sold the property, gave the lessee notice, and the lessee
28. Id. at 872.
29. Id. at 874.
30. Id. at 874. The court stated that a purchase option is placed in a lease for
the benefit of the lessee and is to be construed with that in mind. Also, in consid-
ering the contract, it must be construed as a whole, and the intentions of the
parties is to be ascertained from the entire instrument. Id.
31. Id. at 875.
32. 125 Ill. 85, 17 N.E. 60 (1888).
1985]
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made no election to purchase. 33
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the lessee's failure to ex-
ercise the right of first refusal terminated the fixed price option.
Therefore, the lessee could not maintain a suit for specific per-
formance.34 The court reasoned that the lessee "could not consist-
ently with any principle of fair and honest dealing, under the con-
tract which he had made, destroy the opportunity of making a sale,
wait until the expiration of the year to see if there might not be an
increase in value of the land, and then exercise his option to
purchase.' ' 5
In Manasse v. Ford,"6 the California District Court of Appeal
also held that failure to exercise a right of first refusal extinguished
any fixed price option. The lessees maintained that the right to
purchase under the fixed price option continued in spite of their
refusal to exercise the right of first refusal. To support their argu-
ment, the lessees pointed to a proviso in the lease that said even if
the lessor sold the property, the sale was subject to the lease and
that the lease, its conditions, restrictions and covenants would be
binding on the lessees and the purchaser.38 The court did not agree
with the lessees' interpretation of this clause. It concluded that the
lease gave the lessor the unqualified right to make a sale should
the lessees not exercise the right of first refusal. The proviso sim-
ply meant that the lessees could not be deprived of possession dur-
ing the entire term of the lease. To say that the proviso continued
in force the very options that were to be extinguished by a sale
would be to reason in a circle. Such was not the intention of the
parties.39
In Adams v. Helburn,4° a lease contained a fixed price option
coupled with a right of first refusal. The right of first refusal clause
concluded with the language: "in the event that lessee fails to
promptly exercise this privilege by purchase of and payment for
said property, it shall not be binding."'" The court admitted that
the language was not as clear as it could be, but construed it to
33. Id. at 88, 17 N.E. at 60.
34. Id. at 90, 17 N.E. at 61.
35. Id., 17 N.E. at 62.
36. 58 Cal. App. 312, 208 P. 354 (1922).
37. Id. at 317, 208 P. at 356.
38. Id. at 314, 208 P. at 355.
39. Id. at 317, 208 P. at 356.
40. 198 Ky. 546, 249 S.W. 543 (1923).
41. Id. at 547, 249 S.W. at 543.
[Vol. 7:349
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mean that the lessee's failure to exercise the first refusal option
extinguished the fixed price option and left the lessee with the op-
tion of purchasing "at the figure offered," whether that be the
amount set in the fixed price option or a higher amount.4 2
Shell Oil Co. v. Blum berg4 3 is a leading modern case in this
area. Shell retained the right to purchase the leased premises at
any time during the lease term for a fixed price of $10,000. Shell
further retained a right of first refusal obligating the lessor to give
Shell notice of any bona fide third party offers and first refusal
rights to purchase on the same terms as those offered by the third
party. The contract further provided that "Lessee's failure to exer-
cise any option herein contained shall not in any way affect this
lease or the rights of Lessee in the estate hereby created." 44 When
the lessor gave notice of a bona fide offer from a third party, Shell
declined to exercise its right of first refusal and specifically stated
that its rejection of the offer was without prejudice to any of its
other rights under the lease. 5 Three years later, still during the
lease term, Shell tried to exercise its fixed price option against the
purchaser. The court held that Shell's fixed price option was extin-
guished by its failure to exercise the right of first refusal.4" The
court interpreted the right of first refusal clause as limiting or
modifying the fixed price option. Once Shell refused to purchase
on the same terms as the third party offer, the fixed price option
lapsed and Shell's remaining rights were under the right of first
refusal clause."7
Texaco, Inc. v. Rogow48 was relied on by the lessors in Texaco,
Inc. v. Creel as authority for the proposition that failure to exer-
cise first refusal rights terminates the fixed price option.49 In
Rogow, the language in the lease was almost identical to that in
Creel, with the exception of an added clause specifying that the
fixed price option could not be exercised before the end of the
ninth year of the ten year lease.50 One day before the ninth year
was up, the lessors notified Texaco of a bona fide offer from a third
42. Id. at 548, 249 S.W. at 543-44.
43. 154 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1946).
44. Id. at 252.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 252-53.
48. 150 Conn. 401, 190 A.2d 48 (1963).
49. Id. at 405, 190 A.2d at 50-51.
50. Id. at 403, 190 A.2d at 50.
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party which the lessors desired to accept. Several days later, after
the end of the ninth year of the lease, Texaco attempted to exer-
cise its fixed price option.51
Texaco based its claim to this right on a clause in the lease
providing that:
[a]ny option herein granted shall be continuing and pre-emptive,
binding on the lessor's heirs, devisees, administrators, executors,
or assigns and the failure of [Texaco] to exercise same in any one
case shall not affect [Texaco's] right to exercise such option in
other cases thereafter arising during the term of this lease .... 52
The court held that Texaco's fixed price option could be exer-
cised only after the first nine years of the lease term and then only
before Texaco received notice from the lessors of a bona fide offer
from a third party.53 The court indicated that to hold otherwise
would be to wholly subordinate the first refusal provision to the
fixed price option and render inoperative the provision expressly
giving the lessors the unrestricted opportunity to attempt to obtain
the fair value of the property during the first nine years. 54 Ac-
cepting Texaco's construction, the fixed price option would control
the price at which the property could be sold to a third party dur-
ing the first nine years of the lease even though, by the express
terms of the lease, Texaco could not exercise the fixed price option
until after the ninth year. Any bona fide purchaser would be obli-
gated to convey the property to Texaco upon demand by Texaco
after the nine year period at the fixed price.55
Professor Corbin in his treatise on contracts56 disagrees with
the result in Rogow. He maintains that the court's holding greatly
decreases the value of the fixed price option by making it condi-
tional on the absence of any higher offer from a third person and
by making it unsafe for the lessee to make any expensive improve-
ments on the property. Corbin concludes that if this decision were
approved and followed, no lessee or other option holder should
ever include in the contract a right of first refusal. 57
51. Id. at 404, 190 A.2d at 50.
52. Id. at 406, 190 A.2d at 51.
53. Id at 409, 190 A.2d at 52.
54. Id. at 407-08, 190 A.2d at 51-52.
55. Id. at 407, 190 A.2d at 51.
56. 1A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1963, Supp. 1971).
57. Id. at § 261B (Supp.' 1971).
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ANALYSIS
Texaco, Inc. v. Creel involved the construction and interpreta-
tion of two potentially conflicting option clauses in a lease. Con-
sider the clauses in question:
(11) - Option to Purchase. Lessor hereby grants to lessee the
exclusive right, at lessee's option, to purchase the demised prem-
ises, free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, including leases,
(which were not on the premises at the date of this lease) at any
time during the term of this lease or any extension or renewal
thereof,
(a) for the sum of Fifty Thousand dollars; it being understood
that if any part of said premises be condemned, the amount of
damages awarded to or accepted by lessor as a result thereof shall
be deducted from such price,
(b) On the same terms and at the same price as any bona fide
offer for said premises received by lessor and which offer lessor
desires to accept. Upon receipt of a bona fide offer, and each time
any such offer is received, lessor (or his assigns) shall immediately
notify lessee, in writing, of the full details of such offer, including
the name and address of any offeror, whereupon the lessee shall
have thirty (30) days after receipt of such notice in which to elect
to exercise lessee's prior right to purchase. No sale of or transfer
of title to said premises shall be binding on lessee unless and until
these requirements are fully complied with.
Any option herein granted shall be continuing and pre-emptive,
binding on the lessor's heirs, devisees, administrators, executors,
or assigns, and the failure of lessee to exercise same in any one
case shall not affect lessee's right to exercise such option in other
cases thereafter arising during the term of this lease or any exten-
sion or renewal thereof.5 8
The court held that the interpretation most faithful to the lan-
guage was that the fixed price option continued to bind the lessors
or their successors in interest even if the lessee fails to meet a bona
fide third-party offer.59
In analyzing the court's holding, we must begin where it be-
gan-by asking: What effect did the parties intend the option
clauses to have? To answer that primary question, the court ex-
amined "the language of the contract, the purposes of the contract
...[and its] subject matter, and the situation of the parties at the
58. 310 N.C. at 697, 314 S.E.2d at 507.
59. Id. at 704, 314 S.E.2d at 511.
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time the contract [was] executed." 60
A. The Language
Several rules of contract construction played important roles
in the court's consideration of the contract language. One such rule
is that a contract is to be construed as a whole. Each clause must
be considered with reference to the other provisions and be given
effect, if possible, by any reasonable construction." The court ap-
proved of the South Dakota Supreme Court's statement in Crow-
ley v. Texaco, Inc.6 2 that "[e]very effort should be made to give
effect to every part of the contract and the interpretation should
not be such as to excise any provisions."63 This concern was clearly
important to the court.
o The North Carolina Supreme Court refused to follow the lead
of Texaco, Inc. v. Rogow6 4 which interpreted substantially similar
language as rendering the fixed price option ineffective once the
lessee failed to exercise the right of first refusal. The Creel court
indicated that to so hold would be to give no effect to the "contin-
uing and preemptive" language following the right of first refusal
option.6 The court may also have chosen not to follow Rogow be-
cause the court recognized the wisdom in the Rogow court's procla-
mation that "[slince such contracts, although often generally simi-
lar, are worded differently and executed under varying
circumstances, a decision interpreting and construing one contract
is far from controlling in a case involving another." 66
In following Crowley v. Texaco, Inc.,6 7 the court gave at least
tacit approval to a second rule of contract construction enunciated
by the Crowley court: A purchase option is for the benefit of the
lessee and is to be construed with that in mind.68 Counsel for the
lessors argued in their brief that this rule is not law in North Caro-
60. Id. at 699-700, 314 S.E.2d at 508.
61. Security National Bank v. Educators Mutual Life Insurance Co., 265 N.C.
86, 143 S.E.2d 270 (1965).
62. 306 N.W.2d 871 (S.D. 1981).
63. 310 N.C. at 703, 314 S.E.2d at 510 quoting Crowley, 306 N.W.2d 871, 874.
64. 150 Conn. 401, 190 A.2d 48 (1963).
65. 310 N.C. at 704, 314 S.E.2d at 509-10.
66. 150 Conn. at 406, 190 A.2d at 51.
67. 306 N.W.2d 871.
68. 310 N.C. at 703, 314 S.E.2d at 510, quoting Crowley, 306 N.W.2d 871,
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lina."9 Counsel pointed to the established rule which requires that
an ambiguity in a written contract be construed against the party
who prepared the writing.70 Since Texaco drafted the lease, any
ambiguity in the option provisions should be construed against it.71
Counsel for the lessors failed to point out that this rule cannot
have the effect of modifying the plain provisions of the written in-
strument when it is signed by the other party and there is no evi-
dence of fraud or misrepresentation.7 2 The court apparently ac-
cepted the option clauses as "plain provisions" rather than
ambiguities.
B. The Purposes
An examination of the general purposes of the dual option
provisions points the way to an understanding of the proper inter-
play of the two option provisions. The Blumberg73 and Rogow7 4
courts interpreted the right of first refusal option as limiting or
modifying the fixed price option. The Rogow court reasoned that if
the lessee were allowed to exercise the fixed price option after it
had declined to meet a third party offer, the lessee could effec-
tively control the price at which a third party would offer to buy
the property during the entire term of the lease. 6
The Creel court was clearly dissatisfied with the reasoning in
Rogow. Without explicitly saying so, the court may have accepted
Professor Corbin's view that "[t hat is exactly the purpose for
which the option was purchased and paid for. That factor largely
determined the amount of the rental paid to the lessor. It is that
factor that gave security to the lessee in erecting buildings and
making permanent improvements. 7' The court recognized that
Texaco had a commercially justifiable interest in protecting its
substantial investment in permanent improvements to the land in
69. Defendant-Appellees' Brief at 8, Texaco Inc. v. Creel, 310 N.C. 695, 314
S.E.2d 506 (1984).
70. Wachovia Bank & Trust v. Medford, 258 N.C. 146, 128 S.E.2d 141 (1962).
71. Defendant-Appellees' Brief at 8, Texaco Inc. v. Creel, 310 N.C. 695, 314
S.E.2d 506 (1984), citing Contracting Co. v. Ports Authority, 284 N.C. 732, 738,
202 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1974).
72. Merchants Oil Co. v. Mecklenburg County, 212 N.C. 642, 194 S.E. 114
(1937).
73. 154 F.2d 251.
74. 150 Conn. 401, 190 A.2d 48.
75. Id. at 407, 190 A.2d at 51.
76. CORBIN, supra note 56, at § 261B.
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the form of filling station facilities.77 Without the right to purchase
the property at the fixed price throughout the lease-term, Texaco
would be in the position of having to meet any bona fide offer from
a third party or risk losing its investment. Also, without the fixed
option right, Texaco would be in an inferior bargaining position
when renegotiating the lease. It would have to pay whatever the
lessors demanded or lose its investment. These factors clearly in-
fluenced the court to reject the Rogow court's interpretation.
The court still had to determine what effect, if any, the first
refusal provision had on the fixed price option. The court accepted
the view adhered to in Butler v. Richardson,78 a leading case in
this area. Addressing the first refusal provision, the Butler court
said, "the question here is what effect this provision for a first re-
fusal has, if any, upon the provision for an option. As we indicated
above it has no effect whatever. The right of option remains
unimpaired. '79
The Butler court also addressed what purpose the right of first
refusal provision could have in light of its interpretation of the re-
lationship between the two provisions: "[T]he provision for a first
refusal may nevertheless serve a useful purpose. It provides a
means whereby [lessors], if they desired, could induce an accelera-
tion of [lessees'] decision to purchase by affording them an oppor-
tunity to purchase at a price more advantageous to them than the
price fixed in the option." 80 For example, the lessors may receive a
third party offer for less than the price set in the fixed price op-
tion. For whatever reason, the lessors may desire to accept this of-
fer. By communicating this offer to the lessee in accordance with
the right of first refusal, the lessors may induce the lessee to
purchase immediately rather than carry on with the lease
agreement.
The Creel court considered this purpose to be a motivating
factor in the lessors' decision to enter into this lease. The court
said, "[t]he lessors were most likely concerned about being in a
position to induce lessee to buy the property at a price more ad-
vantageous than the fixed price option, should they no longer wish
to have their asset tied up in a long-term lease."81 Thus, the court
77. 310 N.C. at 704-05, 314 S.E.2d at 511.
78. 74 R.I. 344, 60 A.2d 718 (1948).
79. Id. at 349, 60 A.2d at 722.
80. Id. at 349-50, 60 A.2d at 722.
81. 310 N.C. at 705, 314 S.E.2d at 511.
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found their interpretation of the dual options served the purposes
of both the lessors, Creel, and the lessee, Texaco.2 With the fixed
price option exercisable at any time during the term of the lease,
Texaco enhanced its investment in permanent improvements by
protecting against a sharply rising local real estate market and pro-
hibitive rental rates when renegotiating the lease. The lessors, by
way of the right of first refusal provision, had a way to accelerate
the lessee's exercise of the fixed price option should the lessors no
longer want to keep the property. On the other hand, the Rogow
court's interpretation of the right of first refusal as a limitation on
the fixed price option would completely frustrate Texaco's com-
monsense desire to protect its substantial investment by rendering
the fixed price option ineffectual.8 4
The interpretation arrived at by the court through analyzing
the purpose of the provisions clearly comports with sound princi-
ples of contract and property law. Professor Corbin, in his treatise
on contracts,8 5 discusses the exact situation being considered here.
He states: "A party may acquire a Power of Acceptance at one
price and at the same time a Right of First Refusal at another
price, with respect to the very same subject matter. There is no
inconsistency between these two provisions. '86 Professor Corbin
goes on to explain that the fixed price option is an irrevocable offer
creating in the offeree a power of acceptance conditioned only
upon the offeree's own voluntary act of acceptance. Conversely, the
right of first refusal is not an offer at all, but a promise creating in
the offeree a right to be given the first offer.87
Professor Corbin discusses a situation on point with Creel: the
situation in which the offeror (lessor) receives, and desires to ac-
cept, an offer from a third party that is higher than the fixed price
option. He states that the offeror (lessor) cannot be rid of his duty
to the offeree (lessee) not to sell simply by notifying the offeree
(lessee) of the third party's offer and his desire to accept it. Such
notice would empower the offeree (lessee) to accept at the higher
price, but a sufficient reason not to is that he still has the power of
accepting the lessor's previous irrevocable offer for the remainder
82. Id.
83. Note, Contract Interpretation Problems and the Dual Option Lease, 14
WM. & MARY L. REV. 457, 464 (1972-73).
84. Id.
85. CORBIN, supra note 56.
86. Id. at § 261B at 491 (emphasis added).
87. Id.
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of the option period.88
Under principles of property law, there is nothing incongruous
about the fixed price option binding third party purchasers of the
property as long as the option is exercised within the option pe-
riod. The option is part of a recorded instrument that imposes a
burden on realty. The obligations of the option are not personal
but amount to covenants running with the land.8
C. The Situation of the Parties
The court restated a fundamental rule of construction when it
said, "in construing a contract we look. . . at the situation of the
parties at the time the contract was made."90 Contracts are viewed
prospectively from the time they were made and the intentions of
the parties at that time are controlling. The court believed that the
situation of the parties in 1949, when the lease was made, indi-
cated they intended both options to continue even if a third party
offer was not met by the lessee.9 In support of that belief, the
court pointed to the disparity in local property values today as
compared to 1949. The court concluded that in 1949 "[it] was un-
likely that either party anticipated the dramatic increases in prop-
erty values on Franklin Street in Chapel Hill which have occurred
in the intervening years." 92
The lessors argued that to construe the fixed price option as
enforceable against them and all third parties who purchased the
property from them, in spite of the fact that the lessee failed to
exercise its right of first refusal, would be to place a ceiling on the
amount that the property could be sold for during the entire thirty
years of the lease and its renewals. Such a construction of the dual
options would deprive the lessors of all appreciation in value. The
court recognized the harsh effect of their interpretation," but cor-
rectly observed a rule of construction dictating that the courts may
not grant relief merely because the contract is a harsh one.95 The
88. Id. at 494.
89. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Frazelle, 226 N.C. 724, 40 S.E.2d 367
(1946), citing Crotts v. Thomas, 226 N.C. 385, 387, 38 S.E.2d 158, 159 (1946).
90. 310 N.C. at 704, 314 S.E.2d at 511.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Defendant-Appellees' Brief at 8, Texaco, Inc. v. Creel, 310 N.C. 695, 314
S.E.2d 506 (1984).
94. 310 N.C. at 704, 314 S.E.2d at 511.
95. Weyerhauser Co. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 257 N.C. 717, 127 S.E.2d
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courts cannot make better, or more equitable agreements for the
parties than they themselves had been satisfied to make. Further,
the court cannot rewrite contracts because they operate harshly or
inequitably as to one of the parties or, by construction, relieve one
of the parties of terms to which it voluntarily consented to."
The court also pointed out that the amount set in the fixed
price option was a bargained-for sum. The court reviewed Rogow
97
and Crowley,98 two other cases in which Texaco was both the
drafter of the lease and lessee, and concluded that Texaco did not
have a uniform price it insisted upon in the fixed price option. The
rent was only $100 per month for the entire term of the lease.
Given this fact, the court considered it probable that the lessors
viewed the $50,000 fixed price option as being reasonable, even at
the end of the lease term.9
CRITICISM
From the foregoing analysis, it cannot be seriously argued that
the court made an incorrect decision, at least from the standpoint
of established rules of contract construction. But there is room for
argument that the lessors' interpretation is just as tenable as the
court's interpretation for somewhat different reasons. The court's
primary purpose was to give effect to the intentions of the parties
as expressed by the language used in the contract. Can it be be-
lieved that if someone had told the lessors in 1949 that they could
not sell their property for more than $50,000 at any time during
the thirty year period of the lease, even if someone offered them
substantially more, they would have agreed to it? The court at-
tempted to answer this question by saying that it was probable
that the lessors viewed the $50,000 fixed price option as being rea-
sonable even at the end of the lease term,100 but the court's conclu-
sion is speculative at best.
The court accepted the view that the right of first refusal pro-
vided a means whereby the lessors, if they wished, could accelerate
Texaco's decision to purchase by giving it an opportunity to buy
the property at a better price than that fixed in the option. The
539 (1962).
96. 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 242 (1979).
97. 150 Conn. 401, 190 A.2d 48.
98. 306 N.W.2d 871.
99. 310 N.C. at 705, 314 S.E.2d at 511.
100. Id.
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court considered this a motivating factor in the-lessors' decision to
enter into the lease. The right of first refusal as the lessors inter-
preted it probably was a motivating factor. But as the court inter-
preted it, the acceleration would only occur at a price under that
fixed in the option. It is difficult to see how such a dubious benefit
could have been a motivating factor for the lessors.
Further, can it be believed that the $50,000 fixed price option
was really a bargained-for sum as the court concluded?101 In spite
of the fact that Rogow and Crowley demonstrate that even though
the lease agreement was a standard-form contract and there was
no uniform price that Texaco insisted upon in the fixed price op-
tion, one may question whether the individual lessors and Texaco,
an industrial giant, could ever have bargained on equal footing.
Texaco drafted this lease. Should the lease not have been con-
strued against Texaco as the lessors suggested? 102 To do so, the
court would have had to modify what it considered to be "the plain
provisions" of the written agreement-something the court was
clearly unwilling to do. But had the "plain provisions" been con-
sidered "ambiguities" by the court, there may have been a differ-
ent result. There is no question that these "plain provisions" are
capable of two distinctly different interpretations. This is evi-
denced by the conflicting case law from around the country. Tex-
aco, a huge corporate lessee, drafted this lease. Why shouldn't they
be penalized for not drafting the lease in clear, precise terms that
explain how the fixed price option and right of first refusal work
and relate to each other?
Further, as the lessors also suggested, why shouldn't the court
have construed the fixed price option strictly in favor of the op-
tionor given the unilateral nature of the option and its effect of
restraining alienation?'0 3 The answer may have to do with the pur-
pose of an option. It is for the benefit of the optionee (lessee). The
court accepted the principle that the option should be construed
with that in mind.10 4
As can be seen, there are some valid questions that the court
could have answered differently given a slightly different set of
facts. Contracts, although often similar in effect, are worded differ-
101. Id.
102. Defendant-Appellees' Brief at 8, Texaco Inc. v. Creel, 310 N.C. 695, 314
S.E.2d 506 (1984).
103. Id.
104. 310 N.C. at 703-04, 314 S.E.2d at 510-11.
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ently and created under varying circumstances. Thus, a decision
interpreting one is far from controlling in a case involving an-
other.10 5 This case cannot not be relied on as a substitute for a
precisely drafted contract.
CONCLUSION
The court held that Texaco's election not to exercise its con-
tractual right of first refusal did not terminate, or in any way im-
pair its rights under the fixed price option especially where con-
tract language specifically called for the option, rights to continue
in the lessee even in the event of such refusal. This result recog-
nizes that the fixed price option and the right of first refusal provi-
sion are intended to operate separately, and that to interpret the
latter as limiting the former deprives the lessee of the protection it
sought for its substantial investment in improvements and poten-
tially emasculates the fixed price option. The result recognizes that
an option, by its very nature, is an irrevocable offer, bought and
paid for, which is conditioned only upon the lessee's acceptance,
not the mere notice of a third party offer.
The court's decision is sound but not without its troubling
questions: Were the intentions of the parties really given effect?
Why shouldn't Texaco, the drafter, bear any unpleasant conse-
quences of its poorly drafted lease? Troubling though they may be,
they do not override the fundamentally correct application of the
law to the facts of this case.
Mark Scruggs
105. 150 Conn. at 406, 190 A.2d at 51.
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